DISEASE OF THE MIND
R. v. Cooper (1979) SCC
Defined “disease of the mind” as “any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, excluding, however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion.”
Since Daviault, transitory states of extreme intoxication don’t qualify as a disease of the mind but chronic conditions caused by drug abuse may qualify. In Rabey, the dissociate state caused by the accused being romantically rejected derived from internal factors that constituted a disease of the mind; however, this state was unlikely to recur meaning that it would be unduly intrusive to subject the accused to treatments and possible detention. Diabetics – if they fail to take insulin or eat – external factors.
R. v. Abbey (1982) SCC
The trial judge found that the accused had knowingly imported cocaine but his disease of the mind precluded him from appreciating the consequences of his actions. He was under the assumption that he was protected from punishment by an unseen external force. SCC found the trial judge erred because the phrase in 16.2 of “appreciation of the nature and quality of an act” was limited to an appreciation of the physical consequences of the act, not the accused’s appreciation of the penal consequences of the act, which does not go to the mens rea of an offence.
CAPACITY TO KNOW THAT THE ACT IS WRONG
Under CC16.1, the two formulations of the mental disorder defense are:
1. incapable of appreciating the nature or quality of the act or omission
2. incapable of knowing the act is wrong
Swain
At common law, the Crown could adduce evidence of insanity over and above the accused’s wishes. This breached s.7 and 9 of the Charter and could not be saved under s.1.
R. v. Schwartz
Established that the accused must be unable to know the act was legally wrong. One is not insane if they knew what they were doing and knew they were committing a crime. Knowing the act is legally wrong suffices. This expanded the scope of the criminal responsibility unacceptably to include persons who by reasons of disease of the mind were incapable of knowing that an act was wrong according to normal and reasonable standards of society even though they were aware that the act was formally a crime. Legally wrong standard
R. v. Chaulk (1990) SCC
Reversed Schwartz for the approach that wrong means morally wrong, not just legally wrong. A person may be aware that an act is contrary to law but by disease of the mind is incapable of knowing that the act is morally wrong. Morally wrong standard
Landry
This confirms the morally wrong standard. The accused thought he was God killing Satan. The defense of mental disorder is available if the paranoid delusion at the time of the act deprived him of the capacity of rational perception and thus determining the rightness or wrongness of the act.
AUTOMATISM
It is a fundamental principle that a person is only to be held responsible for conscious intentional acts. Automatism is related to the mental disorder defense. An accused who acts in a automatic state will normally satisfy one of the two arms of the mental disorder test found in CC16.1. La Forest J defines automatism as “conceptually a subset of the voluntariness requirement which, in turn, is a part of the actus reus component of criminal liability.” Automatism is a legal term that refers to unconscious or involuntary behavior.
R. v. Kay (1971) Ont. H.C.J.
The legal defense of automatism is a term used to describe unconscious involuntary behavior of a person that is capable of action but is not conscious about his actions. “The mind does not go with what is being done.”
R. v. Revelle (1979) Ont. CA
The drunken accused entered the Amey home and demanded $10,000. Non-insane automatism defense was not open to the respondent.
R. v. McDowell (1980) Ont. CA
The accused was charged with dangerous driving. He was an on-duty cop who had been drinking on the job and using narcotic pain-killers to numb the pain of a sore elbow.
R. v. Rabey (1980) SCC
A U of T student was infatuated with his classmate, who spurned his advances and wrote a letter making fun of him which he later found in her notebook. He attacked her in a secluded stairwell and proceeded to threaten a fellow student who came to her rescue with death. An expert witness testified that R went into a severe dissociative state that was prompted by “stress in an area that is important to that individual.” The Ont. CA stated that one would only have the defense of non insane automatism if he went into an automatic state because of an extraordinary event. The SCC dismissed this by saying that if the accused had gone into an automatic state, the defense would have to be insane automatism. Only extraordinary mental blows that would make an average person go into a dissociative state would qualify as non insane automatism. R got a clean bill of health and did not have to undergo further psychiatric treatment. There are three classes of mental disorder:
1. Psychoses – major mental illness
2. Neuroses – minor mental illness (dissociative state)
3. Personality/Character disorders
0 comments ↓
There are no comments yet...Kick things off by filling out the form below.
Leave a Comment